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Ireland and the UK Rehearsed Losing a Subsea Cable: What It Means for Your Site’s Resilience

Key takeaways

  • On 30 September 2026, Ireland and the UK ran their first joint exercise simulating an attack on the subsea cables between the two countries.

  • A national response plan coordinates repairs – it does not keep your cameras, SCADA or payments online in the meantime.

  • A different connection type, such as 4G/5G or Starlink, adds real local diversity, but upstream routes still need checking.

What happened?

On 30 September 2026, Ireland and the UK ran their first joint readiness exercise for an attack on the subsea cables that connect the two countries. It was a desktop drill: officials worked through a simulated scenario in which several cable links in the Irish Sea were disrupted, testing how the two governments would coordinate a response.

Ireland’s Minister for Communications, Patrick O’Donovan, described the exercise as a ‘key milestone’ in preparing for disruption to shared subsea infrastructure.

The exercise delivers on the Subsea Infrastructure Bilateral Collaboration Framework, agreed by Taoiseach Micheál Martin and Prime Minister Keir Starmer at the UK-Ireland Summit in Cork on 12-13 March 2026 . The two leaders pointed to ‘a more contested environment’ and increased hostile state activity as the reasons for the programme, and further exercises are planned.

This IS a drill – not an outage!

No cable was cut, and nothing failed. It is worth keeping that in view, because a government drill can easily be read as a sign that the risk is new or suddenly more urgent.

It is not new. The subsea cables carrying Irish and UK international traffic have been a known pinch point for years. Since 2022, European governments have raised alert levels and run similar exercises following a series of cable and pipeline incidents in the Baltic Sea.

What has changed is that Ireland and the UK now formally coordinate their response. That tells us more about government planning than about any specific threat to any business this week.

A national plan is not a site plan

A government response plan is built for the hours and days after a major subsea incident: alerting operators, sending repair ships and managing public communications.

It is not designed to keep an ARC’s camera feeds, a solar farm’s SCADA link or a retail site’s card payments running while repairs happen. That is a site-level question. It existed before this exercise, and it will still exist after it, however well the two governments coordinate.

What does a second connection actually protect you from?

Having more than one connection protects a site against a single provider’s own failure: an exchange fault, a damaged line or a provider’s equipment going down. The site simply has another way out.

Two ISP’s are not always two routes

Ireland’s connectivity to the UK runs over roughly nine subsea cable systems in the Irish Sea, owned and operated by companies including ASN, SubCom, Vodafone and euNetworks. That is genuine diversity at infrastructure level.

However, retail providers do not generally publish which cable system carries a given customer’s international traffic. Two fixed-line contracts at one site protect against almost everything, except the chance that both use the same cable system for a given destination. The only way to know is to ask each provider directly, rather than assume diversity from having two bills.

A different connection type helps, with limits

Adding a different type of connection, such as 4G/5G or Starlink, changes the last mile and the access network. It gives real independence from a single duct running past the site and from one provider’s local infrastructure.

It does not, on its own, guarantee that every path stays separate further upstream. A mobile operator’s backhaul and a satellite ground station’s onward link still rely on terrestrial and subsea capacity somewhere. That is a fair question to put to your cellular or satellite provider too.

Where Netcelero fits

The Netcelero i-ctrl gives a site a fixed public IP across fibre, 4G/5G and Starlink, failing over automatically if the primary connection drops and failing back when it returns. Your ARC, operations team or SCADA provider keeps connecting to the same address, whichever path is live. The value of that failover depends on the paths underneath being genuinely different, which is why the questions above matter.

What no connectivity product can fix

To be clear about the limits: Netcelero does not repair or reroute around a subsea cable fault. That infrastructure sits upstream of any individual site.

Nor can any connectivity product, ours included, fix a disruption inside the cloud, CDN or DNS services your applications depend on. What multiple, genuinely diverse connections change is how exposed a single site is to upstream risk, not whether that risk exists.

What to do next

The sensible response is not to react to a drill. It is to understand your own setup. Three questions are a good start:

  • Which cable systems and transit routes does each of your providers use for your site’s traffic? Ask for the answer in writing.
  • Is a genuinely different connection type, such as 4G/5G or Starlink, part of your failover, or only a second ISP’s name on an invoice?
  • If your primary connection drops, will your ARC or operations team still reach the site on the same address?

Asked your providers? We can help you make sense of the answers.

If you run monitored or multi-site infrastructure, send us what your providers tell you. We will help you understand their answers and whether your connections genuinely protect your site if one path fails.